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TRUSTS AND ESCROWS IN CREDIT
CONVEYANCING
By GEORGE GLEASON BOGEaT*
It would be interesting to compare the relative merits of the
contract to convey, "lease-sale," mortgage, trust deed, escrow, bond
for title, trust to convey, long term lease, and other methods of
transferring title to land and securing protection for the seller in
the collection of the price. The kind of land, financial condition of
the buyer, use to which the land is to be put, transferability of
interests of seller and buyer, refinancing of existing encumbrances,
protection against death, mistake, dishonesty, and misfortune, rela-
tive expense, and other factors doubtless make one scheme prefer-
able on one occasion and another in another instance. Such an ex-
tended inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper. The sole effort
which can here be made is to contrast some of the advantages and
disadvantages of the escrow and trust methods of collecting the
purchase price and securing a deed and title, especially with refer-
ence to qualities emphasized in the litigation of the past twenty
years. There is excluded from the discussion (1) escrows when
the object is other than the collection of the price, as, for example,
escrows to allow the seller to bring his evidence of title down to
date; (2) all cases where no sale of land is involved, as, for exam-
ple, where a gift is to be made and the deed is depositid to be
handed to the grantee on the death of the grantor; and (3) cases
where there is a sale of land contemplated but no contract made,
and consequently placing the deed with a third party to deliver, if
the grantee does an act, is merely an offer to convey.
A and B have made a bargain for the sale of land by A to B.
This contract may or may not be in writing or evidenced by a mem-
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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orandum. B is unable to pay the full price at once and is to be
given credit. A desires to retain such control of the land as to in-
sure the payment of the price in full or the restoration of the land to
him. If he takes the escrow method, A will execute a deed of the
land to B and place the deed in the hands of X to be delivered to
B on the full payment of the price by B to X for A. If B makes
timely paymeni of the price to X, the latter will hand the deed to
B and the legal title to the land will vest in B; and X will then pay
the money over to A. If B fails to make such payment, X will be
under a duty to return the deed to A.
Should A desire to use the trust method in similar circum-
stances, he will convey the land to a trustee to hold for A and B,
pending performance of the contract by B. The interests of the two
beneficiaries will be roughly measured, respectively, by the amount
due on the contract and the value of the land less such amount due.
The trustee will be under a duty to receive, hold and distribute pay-
ments made by B, in accordance with the provisions of a trust in-
strument executed by him at the time of the conveyance to him, and
to convey legal title to B on performance by B.
These methods are similar in that both hold back from the
buyer the legal title until full performance, but they differ in the
location of the suspended legal title. In the escrow the legal title
remains in the grantor, A, while in the trust the legal estate is vested
in a trustee and the interests of A and B are both made equities.
The trust method has had a very limited use. I is employed
with fair frequency in some cities, as, for example, Chicago and To-
ledo, with especial reference to subdivisions and valuable business
property. There has been practically no litigation to develop its
weakness or strength. In discussing its qualities it is necessary to
rely on well-known principles in the general law of trusts, on con-
versations with trust officers, on correspondence, and on trust instru-
ment forms.
The escrow, on the other hand, has displayed in litigation many
of its more prominent characteristics. An examination of the
American Digest system since 1907 shows 253 cases on escrows, of
which seventy-seven are concerned with contracts, notes, and other
transactions where there was no deed or long lease deposited with a
custodian pending the furnishing of consideration by the grantee.
This leaves 176 cases where a deed or long lease was escrowed to
secure performance of the buyer's contract. The geographical dis-
tribution of these 176 cases is as follows:
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CASES INVOLVING EscRows OF DEED OR LEASE, 1907-1926
Atlantic Reporter States-
Pennsylvania ........................ 4
Vermont ............................. 1
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 5
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
and Maryland ...................... 0
Northeastern Reporter States-
Illinois ............................... 6
New York ........................... 2
Ohio ................................ 2
Indiana .............................. 2
Massachusetts ........................ 0
Southeastern Reporter States-
Georgia .............................. 2
North Carolina ....................... 2
South Carolina ....................... 1
W est Virginia ........................ 2
Virginia ............................. 0
Southern Reporter States-
Alabama ............................. 3
Florida .............................. 4
M ississippi ........................... 1
Louisiana ............................ 0
Northwestern Reporter States-
Iowa ................................ 3
M ichigan ............................ 1
M innesota ............................ 6
North Dakota ........................ 3
South Dakota ........................ 3
Nebraska ............................ 1
W isconsin ........................... 1
Southwestern Reporter States-
Arkansas ............................ 9
M issouri ............................. 2
Tennessee ............................ 1
Texas ............................... 31
Kentucky ............................. 2
Pacific Reporter States-I
California ............................ 22
Colorado ............................. 7
Idaho ................................ 3
Kansas .............................. 11
Oregon .............................. 14
Utah ................................ 3
W ashington ......................... 5
Oklahoma ............................ 10
Arizona .............................. 1
M ontana ............................. 2
New Mexico ......................... 2
W yoming ............................ 1
Nevada .............................. 0
12 6.8%
7 3.9%
8 4.5%
I 18
10%
45 25%
46%
2.8%
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The escrow cases from 1907 to 1926, considered from the point
of view of the use of the land involved, are distributed as follows:
agricultural, 85; town residence, 26; oil and gas, 23; city, 19; un-
known, 10; mining, 3; milling, 3; timber, 3; quarry, 1; hotel, 1;
lighting plant, 1; subdivision, 1.
It thus appears that four out of five of the escrow cases in the
last twenty years have arisen west of the Mississippi River and that
in nearly nine out of ten instances rural or town property has been
involved: The typical case in the recent reports is the deposit of a
deed to farm or town property with a small city bank.
This distribution of cases may mean merely that the law in the
states west of the Mississippi is more unsettled than in the older
sections, or that the escrow is less carefully and efficiently used in
those parts of the country where business is on the whole con-
ducted somewhat informally. But it is believed that to a certain
extent at least the distribution of litigation indicates a wider general
use of the escrow in the west and southwest than in the remaining
parts of the country.
Correspondence with attorneys and title and trust officers has
elicited the opinions given below regarding the current use of con-
veyancing methods in various parts of the country. These opinions
confirm the impressions as to the distribution of escrow use ob-
tained from an examination of the decisions. The long term escrow
is little used east of the Mississippi River.
ATLANTIC REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and Mort-
Deed tiL Full Trust gage or Trust
Payment Deed
Providence, R. L U s e d generally Not used Not used In general use
only for short
period (30 days)
till closing
St. Albans, Vt. .5% .25% .25% 99%
Generally on 1 y Rare (but i s Not used 90% plus
Newark, N. J. preliminary to being discussed)
closing
New Haven, Only temporarily Rare Rare Practically all
Conn. till closing cases
Baltimore, Md. Used by devel- Not used Not used In general use
opers and real (underlying lien
estate dealers created by
r e d e e m a ble
gtound rent
under 9 9 yr.
lease renewrble
forever)
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NORTHEASTERN REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and Mort-
Deed til FuU Trust gage or Trust
Payment Deed
Boston, M a s s. Perhaps used in Not used (dan- Not used Nearly all cases(view No. 1) rare cases, tracts g e r o u s because
being developed power in gran-
tor to convey
and his creditors
to take)
Boston, Mass. Quite common Very rare Very rare (but Very common(view No. 2) Mass. real prop-
erty trust used
frequently as
substitute for
real estate cor-poration)
Toledo, Ohio 10% % 60% 25%(acreage land,
that is, subdivi-
sion property
only)
Canton, Ohio 5 0 % Subcon- Rare Rare 50%.
tracts and pyra-
miding equities
cause complica-
tions
Cincinnati, Ohio Not more than Very seldom used Very unusual At least 75%
5%
Cleveland, Ohio Some cases sub- Short term escrow Rare cases of General method(view No. 1) division property used in 75% of subdivisions
cases
Cleveland, Ohio 25% 20% None 45%(view No. 2)(10% covered by
99 yr. leases use
of whioh is
increasing)
Indianapolis, Ind. 9 0 % p I u s 1% .% (used with 6%(increasing ten- subdivisions indency to use con- 50% cases)
tract for tax
reasons)
New York City Some instances, Not used: lack Not used: Some- In general use
especially s u b - of record; dan- times suggested
urban or cheap gerous by real estate
property promoters, b ut
trust companies
do not like it
Rochester, N. Y. 10% (im o s t I y Scattering cases Not used 90%
vacant building (is being consid-
lots) ered)
Chicago, Ill. Generally used Used where buyer(view No. 1) for title exami- to develop alone
nation cases only or in conjunc-
tion with seller
Ch i c a g o, fI1. Few, except as N u m b e r small, Used commonly General (75-90%)(view No. 2) p r eli minary to but increasing with subdivision
closing day property and also
in some other
cases; use greatly
increased in past
five years
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SOUTHEASTERN REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing I Deed and Mort-
Deed till Full Trust gage or Trust
Payment [ Deed
Alexandria, Va. Preliminary t o Practically n ot Not used General method
closing only used (bargain and saledeed with deed
of trust back)
iNorfolk, Va. Used till 33-50% Not used Not used In 85% cases
price paid in deed and deed of
case of land com- trust back
panies and cheap
property
V a s h i n g -Used as prelim- Very rare Very rare General
ton, D. C. inary to closing
Atlanta, Ga. Method practi- Very rare Not used 99% (loan deed
cally obsolete instead of mort-
gage)
SOUTHERN REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and Mort-
Deed till Full Trust gage or Trust
Payment Deed
Bradenton, Fla. A f e w mere Few eases where Negligible General use
option contracts seller non - resi-
w i t h forfeiture dent or going
clauses away
Birmingham, Not used (lease- Rare (used to Not used 75%
Ala. (view No. 1) sale with forfeit- buy property for
ure of payments n ew industrial
as rent in case enterprises)
of sale cheap
property)
B i r m i n g h am. 15 - 20% (lease- Negligible Negligible 80%
Ala. (view No. 2) s a 1 e contracts;payments called
rent and deed to
be given on fullpayment rent)
Jackson, Miss. Only occasionally Very rare Not used 95-99%
NORTHWESTERN REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and MoI-
Deed tll Ful Trust gage or Trst
Payment Deed
Detroit, Mich. 90% Method in its Not used 5-10%
infancy
Minneapolis, 80% 1% 1% 15%
Minn.
Des Moines, Iowa 75% 5% 5% 15%
Omaha, Neb. 79% 1% Not used 20%
(view No. 1)
Omaha, Neb. 50% 10% Not used 25%
(view No. 2)
Keokuk, Iowa 7% (adapted to 2.5% .5% 90%
cheap land and
irresponsible buy-
ers if forfeiture
clause well
drawn)
Fargo, N. D. 33.3% Very few Negligible 66.6%
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SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and Mort-
Deed till Full Trust gage or Trust
Payment Deed
Kansas City, Mo. Rare; cases cheap Only in cases of Not used In general use;
lots; foreclosure exchanges where deed of trust
troublesome realtor desires to back
bind parties
St. Louis, Mo. Used in cheap Used only pend- Not used except In general use
lot sales till 50% ing perfection of pending perfec-
paid title (disadvan- tion of title
tageous to real-
tor who desires
secrecy regarding
clientele and pos-
sible failure of
deal escrow
business does not
pay except as
feeder)
Tulsa, Okla. (city 5% 25% 10% 20% (remaining
property only) 40% not ac-
counted for un-
less cash sales)
San Antonio, 10 to 20% Very seldom used Very seldom used 80.90%, (vendor's
Tex. lien and deed of
trust)
Beaumont, Tex. 15% 2% Rare 7 5 % (vendor's
lien and deed of
trust)
Little Rock, Ark. Common in small Occasional Rare Deed of trust
transactions used frequently,
especially in large
transactions
Fort Smith, Ark. 25% 25% Not used 50%
PACIFIC REPORTER STATES
City or Town Contract: No Escrow of Deed Conveyancing Deed and Mort-
Deed till Full Trust gage or Trust
Payment Deed
Long Beach, Used especially in S e l d o m used Seldom used (if U s e d generally
Calif. subdivisions with (bankers do not used, is for sub- especially for val-
forfeiture clause like necessity for divisions) uable property
and deed on two- performance of
thirds payment conditions outside
their direct
knowledge)
C o e u r d'Alene, 40% 40% Very rare 20%
Idaho
Portland, Ore. 45% (use in- 2.5% 2.5% 50%
creasing)
Tacoma, Wash. 90% (disadvan- 5% (trend in Not used 5%
tageous to buyer this direction due
under 132 Wash. to lack of protec-
649, to effect tion of buyer
that contract under land con-
vendee has no tract)
interest)
Spokane, Wash. Rare and use 75% Not used Used for farm
decreasing (Bar . property in some
Association work- cases
ing for statute
to overcome 132
Wash. 649)
Denver, Colo. 10% 5% Rare 85%
Salt Lake City, 50% 25% 10% 15%
Utah
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FACT DISPUTES AS TO TEu ms OF ESCROW
Where there is an escrow of the kind here discussed there are
two agreements-the contract to convey, and the contract that the
deed shall be held by a third person and its transmission to the
grantee and operative effect postponed. The former agreement is
generally required to be evidenced by a writing, but the latter may
be wholly oral or partly oral and partly written.2
Whether this rule can be justified on legal principle under the
parol evidence rule or otherwise, is not material here. That the
courts allow oral evidence of the escrow agreement is the sole fact
of interest at this point.
This possible informality of the escrow contract is a weakness
in the device, because it has given rise to frequent dispute and liti-
gation. If the escrow agreement and the consequent instructions to
the custodian of the deed are either wholly or partly oral, there is
opportunity for mistake or fraud on the part of either grantor, de-
positary or grantee. In an attempt to withdraw from the transac-
tion the grantor may seek to impose conditions not actually agreed
upon; the depositary may easily misunderstand or forget an ambigu-
ous, incompletely expressed, verbal instruction; and the grantee may
endeavor to persuade the holder that the terms were lighter than
really fixed.
The dispute concerning the terms of the escrow has usually
taken the form of an action by the grantor against the custodian
for damages for wrongfully delivering the deed to the grantee con-
trary to instructions, that is, prior to the occurrence of the event on
which the deed was supposed to be handed to the buyer.2
In many of these cases the bank or other depositary has been
held liable in damages to the grantor, the measure being the value
1. Macy v. Mielenz 199 Pac. (N. M.) 1011; McLain v. Healy 98 Wash.
489; Miller v. Deahl 239 S. W. (Tex.) 679. There seems to be conflict
whether a written escrow instruction may be supplemented by parol. Gar-
diner v. Gardiner 214 Pac. (Idaho) 218. In England it seems to be custom-
ary to include a phrase in the attestation clause of the deed which shows that
the deed is in escrow. 159 L. T. 27.
2. Jones v. Title Guar. & Trust Co. 173 Pac. (Calif.) 586; Rowland v.
First State Bank 245 Pac. (Kan.) 740; Stone v. Jarbalo State Bank 190 Pac.
(Kan.) 1094 (instructions here were by letter); Sunderlin v. Warner 246
Pac. (Idaho) 1; Keith v. First Nati. Bk. 36 N. D. 315; Fanning Corp. v.
Bridgeport Batk 202 N. W. (Neb.) 911; Muenz v. Bank of Bowdle 198 N.
*W. (S. D.) 710; City Natl. Bk. v. Grimm 262 S. W. (Tex.) 197; Gochnaner
v. Union Trust Co. 225 Pa. 503. In City Natl. Bank v. Grimm 262 S. W.
(Tex.) 197, the depositary was held liable to the grantee for paying money to
the grantor in violation of instructions. A written escrow may often be
ambiguous and cause litigation. Los Angeles City H. S. Dist. v. Quinn 234
Pac. (Calif.) 313. A writing tends to certainty but does not guarantee it.
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of the performance by the buyer of which the seller has been de-
prived by the premature delivery.' Such cases show the danger to
the depositary arising from informal escrows. 4 Many large title and
trust companies now require complete written instructions and have
printed forms raising every conceivable question.
Additional causes of fact dispute are whether the terms of the
escrow were complied with by the grantee5 (assuming that there is
no dispute as to what such terms were), or whether, admitting
non-compliance, the grantor has waived strict performance. 6 These
two questions are not, however, peculiar to escrows and hence no
stress is laid on them here. Whether the grantee-cestui que trust
has performed the terms of a written instrument on which he is to
get a deed from the trustee, or whether there has been waiver of
such written terms, may also cause litigation.
Contest over the terms of the real property conveyancing trust
is not likely to arise. In this -respect the trust is markedly superior
to the escrow. In all but a few states the full terms of the trust, in
order that the trust be enforcible, must be manifested or proved by
a written instrument. This requirement of the Statute of Frauds
forces parties to reduce the terms of the conveyancing, trust to
definite form, or run the risk of having the trustee set up the statute
and keep the land. Furthermore, professional trustees (the sort
usually selected) will for their own protection insist on a complete
statement of the trust in writing. The fourth section of the Statute
of Frauds wilf require the conveyance to the trustee from the
grantor to be written and this deed may contain the trust terms.
At least it will describe the grantee as a trustee.
The several statutory influences insisting upon the reduction of
the terms of the real property trust to writing bring to a minimum
the chances of litigation over the exact nature of such terms. The
lack of corresponding influences in many escrows makes for loose
business deals which stir up quarrels and send the parties to the
courts.
3. Keith v. First Natl. Bk. 36 N. D. 315.
4. "My experience has been that the escrow bolder runs all the risk and
suffers all the losses, both large and small, through misinterpretation of
instructions and otherwise." Growth of Escrow Business, E. L. Farmer, of
Title Ins. & Trust Co., Los Angeles.
5. Miller v. Deahl 239 S. W. (Tex.) 679.
6. Harris v. Geneva Mill Co. 96 So. (Ala.) 622; Sunderlin v. Warner
246 Pac. (Idaho) 1; Oland '. Matson 39 Okla. 456.
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MISLEADING RECORDS IN CASE OF THE ESCROW
The short term escrow, in which papers and money are merely
held pending the bringing of the seller's evidence of title down to
date, often involves an immediate recording of the deed and hence
warns third parties of the pending transaction. If when the title
has been searched down to the time of the recording of the deed,
there is no flaw, the consideration is delivered to -the seller; if the
search discloses an incumbrance, the seller must remove it, or if he
will not or cannot, the buyer may take back his consideration on
executing a quitclaim deed to the seller. Even in short term es-
crows litigation is not uncommon.7
This short term escrow, to bridge the gap in title searching,
is so much in the majority that many escrow officers of title com-
panies think of nothing else when they refer to an escrow. See,
for example, "Building an Escrow Department," by Mr. K. E. Rice
of the Chicago Title and Trust Company." He reports methods by
which a great increase in the use of escrows has been accomplished
in Chicago, but apparently his whole discussion is concerned with
short term escrows.
In the long term escrow, where the object is the withholding
of title until a lump payment or periodic payments are completed,
recording of the deed prior to performance by the buyer is not feas-
ible. The record after the escrow, therefore, may continue to show
full title in the seller and td give no clue to the existence of the
pending escrow. This leaves an opening for fraud by the seller.
It is the escrow grantor's duty to refrain from encumbering, con-
tracting to sell, or selling during the escrow period in such a way
as to shut off the escrow grantee's rights. But the grantor has the
power to convey or mortgage to a bona fide purchaser and the latter
will be superior to the grantee in the unrecorded escrow de'ed.
True, the contract may be recorded in many states,10 and pos-
ession by the grantee will charge the world with notice of his rights
in the land. But some states do not allow record of a contract of
sale," - and there is generally strong objection by the seller to the
7. Lynn v. McCoy 200 S. W. (Tex.) 885; Grimm v. Williams 200 S. W.(Tex.) 1119.
8. 17 Lawy. & Bkr. 371.
9. Wilkins v. Somerville 80 Vt. 48. Dictum, in WIraldock v. Frisco L. Co.
176 Pac. (Okla.) 218.
10. Knapp v. Andrus 180 Pac. (Mont.) 908.
11. The writer is informed that record is not possible in Ohio. See
Ohio Gen. Code sec. 8543. "In some states due to the propensity of operators
to attempt to record all documents, even such as letters relating to land, the
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recording of it because of the possibility that in the case of default
there will thus be attached an encumbrance which will have to be
cleared from the record, possibly by an expensive foreclosure suit.
By refusing to acknowledge the contract, the grantor in some states
can make it unrecordable. Bills to foreclose land contracts fre-
quently carry the parties to the highest state court.1 2 Often it is not
contemplated that the grantee occupy the land before complete per-
formance and hence notice from possession cannot protect.
Cases of loss suffered by the escrow grantee due to a fraudu-
lent second deed or mortgage to a good faith purchaser do not seem
to have arisen frequently recently,13 but in two instances such an
attempt was defeated only by the actual notice which the second
grantee had.1
4
If the land were conveyed to a trustee to hold pending per-
formance, recordation of the deed to the trustee would be almost
inevitable. Thenceforth the book of deeds would show either the
complete terms of the trust or put an interested party on notice of
them and give him opportunity to acquire full knowledge as to the
rights of grantor and grantee, by inquiry of the trustee.
It may be said that the only one likely to be injured by this
lack of record of the escrow is the grantee, and that he is a party
to the escrow agreement and the land contract and can record either
or both if they are written. As a fact, however, no record of such
contractl or contracts is usually made, either because the state does
not allow a record, or the seller coerces the buyer into keeping the
contract off the record, 14a or the buyer does not realize the impor-
tance of such record to him. The trust method, where a record
almost inevitably follows, is preferable for the buyer.
Not only is there practical lack of opportunity for the honest
grantee to protect himself by making a record, but there is fre-
quently a chance for the making of a false record by a dishonest
grantee. The latter may get possession of the deed from the de-
positary by fraud, record it, and create the appearance of perfect
title in the grantee. The deed is genuine. It contains no condition
recording of land contracts has been prohibited or has not been provided for."
Bingham and Andrews "Financing Real Estate," 180.
12. Neher v. Kauffan 242 Pac. (Calif.) 713; McPherson v. Barbour 183
Pac. (Ore.) 752; Anderson v. Morse 222 Pac. (Ore.) 1083.
13. But see Book v. Book 208 Pac. (Colo.) 474, where an escrow grantee
was defeated by a subsequent purchaser with knowledge.
14. Ullendorf v. Graham 87 So. (Fla.) 50; Wilkins v. Somerville 80
Vt. 48.
14a. Subdividers' contracts with lot purchasers in Chicago provide that
if the buyer records the contract, it shall be null and void.
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as to the satisfaction of which a diligent searcher might inquire.
Naturally the fraudulent grantee finds no difficulty in getting a bona
fide purchaser or mortgagee to take a deed or mortgage. But such
bona fide purchaser or mortgagee is not protected by the record.
The condition of the escrow not having been performed, no title
passed to the grantee, and he can convey none, although he was able
to make a record which seemed to show perfect title in him. 5
If the trust had been used, there would have been no such pos-
sibility of fraud on third parties. If the trustee in a trust for con-
veying is fraudulently induced by the intended grantee to convey
to him prior to performance of his contract, title will pass to the
grantee, although it will be a voidable title. A record of this deed
then made by the grantee will show the truth, the existence in him
of legal title. A later transfer of the land by the fraudulent grantee
to a bona fide purchaser will, of course, cut off the equities of the
grantor-beneficiary under the conveyancing trust and give the bona
fide purchaser what the record leads him to think he is getting.
From the point of view of fairness to the public the trust seems
to insure a more honest record of title, the escrow a more mislead-
ing situation. The escrow grantor will of course find an advantage
in the inability of the grantee to get or pass title, no matter what
the state of the record, until performance of the conditions of the
escrow.
CONFLICT AS TO THE LEGAL, THEORY AND RESULTS OF AN EscRow
If two or more devices are available to accomplish the same
result, surely that will be preferred which has the more fixed and
settled characteristics, is the simplest, and is subject to the least
conflict of authority among the courts. The escrow is still an in-
strument of uicertain theory and result, although it has had cen-
turies of use.
Learned authors have disagreed as to the underlying theory of
the escrow deed.' 8 On the one side it is claimed that the escrow
15. Brigham v. Taylor 12 Fed. 2d 15; Weghorst v. Clark 180 Pac.
(Colo.) 742; Houston v. Furman 109 So. (Fla.) 297.
16. Aigler Mich. L. R. 16: 569, 584; Ballantine Yale L. J. 29: 826, 828;
Bigelow Harv. Law Rev. 26:565; Hohfeld Yale Law Jour. 23:16, 4849; Tiffany
Columb. Law Rev. 14:389, 400-401. "Where a seated writing is delivered as an
escrow, it cannot take effect as a deed pending the performance of the condi-
tion subject to which it was delivered; and if that condition be not performed
the writing remains entirely inoperative." 10 Halsbury's Laws of England 387.
"There does not appear to be any precise authority as to the position be-
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affects the delivery of the deed, that until the performance of the
conditions the deed is not delivered and hence of course of no legal
or equitable effect. It is as if the parties had said: "An instru-
ment is to be prepared and placed with X. It is to create no rights,
duties or powers until the grantee pays X $10,000. It is not to be
considered delivered until that event happens. If and when that
event happens, the instrumer,+ is to be a deed, is to be considered
delivered, to have operative effect to put the legal title in the grantee,
and the grantee is to have the right to the possession of the deed
as a muniment of title." This is an arrangement for delivery on
condition precedent.
From the other quarter comes the argument that the escrow
condition affects the title to the land, that the escrow deed is deliv-
ered when handed to the depositary, and that the condition is as to
the time when the deed will have effect in passing title to the
grantee. It is as if the parties had said: 'A deed is to be pre-
pared and delivered to X. It will then become a legally operative
instrument. The terms of such operation are that an estate in fee
simple is to vest in the grantee at a future date, namely, if and when
the grantee pays X $10,000. If such sum is paid X, the estate auto-
matically passes to the grantee, because of the force given the deed
by its original delivery to the depositary." This is a present deed
providing for a future estate, to come into being on the happening of
a condition precedent.
Which of these theories is accepted will determine one's atti-
tude toward the propriety of the admisgion of oral evidence of the
escrow, toward the nature of the interest of the escrow grantee
pending performance, and toward the necessary qualifications of
the escrow depositary.
If the escrow affects delivery only, then oral evidence ought
unhesitatingly to be received to show the escrow agreement, no
matter to whom the instrument has been handed, the grantee or a
third party. That a deed was or was not delivered is a question
very generally capable of proof by oral evidence. If, on the other
hand, the escrow is an attempt to read a condition precedent into
the deed and thus affect the time of passage of property, there
seems to be a violation of the parol evidence rule justfied only by
the insertion of a disinterested third party into the transaction to
hold the deed and prove the escrow condition.
tween the execution of the deed and the performance of the condition, but
it is conceived that no estate passes until the condition has been performed."
158 L. T. 62.
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If the escrow affects delivery only, the pre-existing contract
to convey the land will remain in effect and its enforcibility will de-
cide the nature of the grantee's interest pending the escrow. If
that preceding contract is enforcible specifically, the escrow grantee
should have an equitable interest'in the land, not by virtue of the
escrow deed, but because of the land contract. If on the other hand,
the escrow is deemed to accomplish a passage of property on con-
-dition precedent, then the preceding land contract would seem to be
merged in the deed, and the escrow grantee would seem to have no
estate or interest pending performance, but merely a power to obtain
an estate or interest by performing an act.
The recent cases vary in their treatment of the escrow grantee's
interest. Often the deed, prior to performance, is said to be "a
mere scroll."'"
Where an insurance policy issued to a landowner provides that
the insured cannot collect if there is a change of interest, or the
insured becomes other than the. full and complete owner of the
premises, and later the insured places a deed of the land in escrow,
it is generally held that the grantor remains the full and complete
owner and that no interest, legal or equitable, has passed out of him
to the grantee."8
Even though the buyer may have obtained from the seller prior
to the fire a contract of sale which was specifically enforcible and
thus there passed what is generally regarded as an equitable interest,
in the case of a contract follo%;,red by an escrow of a deed the
grantor seems to remain the full and complete owner for insurance
purposes.
And yet it has also been held that the escrow grantee in pos-
session has a special interest, even though his payments are held
in escrow with a deed, and that he can insure such special interest
and recover its full value in case of a loss.'9
If no interest has passed from the grantor, how can any inter-
est have vested in the escrow grantee?
The escrow grantee, in rescinding for fraud prior to perform-
17. Stone v. Daniels 193 Pac. (Okla.) 986.
18. Ellis v. Home Ins. Co. 193 Pac. (Kan.) 598 ($2,500 had been placed
in escrow by buyer at time of fire and escrow was" later performed com-
pletely) ; Dow v. Ins. Co. 221 Pac. (Kan.) 1112 ($200 paid to grantor prior to
fire, but buyer later defaulted and all payments were .forfeited) ; Penn. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Stockstill 197 S. W. (Tex.) 1036 (no payment made prior to fire
and escrow failed).
19. Bright v. Hanover Ins. Co. 48 Wash. 60. And see Etheridge v. Ins.
Co. 102 (S. C.) 313.
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ance of the condition, need not 'tender a deed or anything else to
the grantor, since the transaction is entirely executory 2 0
On the other hand, there is authority that an escrow vendee not
in default has an equitable interest in the land proportionate to the
value of the land less payments due, and that a creditor of the
vendor can take only the interest of the grantor, measured by the
amount of the unpaid purchase money.2
The escrow grantee, after part payment, has an equitable in-
terest in the land superior to that of a second contract vendee from
the same seller who had notice of the first contract.22
Elsewhere it has been held that part payment gives the escrow
vendee an 'equitable interest' in the land, although not an 'equitable
title,' and hence that the vendor on default by the buyer should pro-
ceed to foreclose the buyer on the theory of a contract and not a
mortgage 
2
The escrow grantee has an interest which he can convey so that
his transferee steps into his shoes.24
It has been held that the escrow grantee who has paid the price
to the depositary has an equity superior to a prior secret equity
against the grantor, even before the deed has been delivered to the
depositary.2 5
THE ULTIMATE EscRow EVENT
What is the act or event which causes the escrow deed to be
considered delivered under one theory, and causes title to pass under
the other hypothesis? Is it the occurrence of the named event (for
example, the payment by the vendee), or the handing of the deed
by the depositary to the vendee, or the happening of the event fol-
lowed by transmission of the deed to the buyer? If the latter, what
is the state of the title after the escrow condition has been per-
formed but prior to the handing of the deed to the buyer? If title
passes on the occurrence of the event alone, there is a possible pe-
riod during which the buyer has title but no chance to protect it by
making a record. If there is uncertainty in the cases concerning
the identity of the ultimate event which completes the escrow trans-
20. Harboi Bus. Blocks Co. v. Gregory 169 Pac. (Kan.) 191.
21. Knapp v. Andrus 180 Pac. (Mont.) 908; May v. Enerson 52 Ore..
262.
22. Ullendorf v. Grahan 87 So. (Fla.) 50.
23. Wyattv. Meade Co. Bk. 166 N. W. (S. D.) 423.
24. Jarvis v. Chanslor & Lyon Co. 177 Pac. (Ariz.) 27.
25. Fuller v. Peabody 1 Fed. (2d) 965; Harv. L. R. 38: 689.
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action, we have another reason for avoiding its use as a convey-
ancing tool.
In a number of late decisions there was no performance of the
condition, but the deed was handed by the depositary to the grantee,
because of the grantee's fraud, or the depositary's mistake. It has
been generally held in these cases that such transmission of the deed
does not accomplish a passage of property to the buyer and that no
title can be passed by the buyer even to a bona fide purchaser.
Transfer of the deed to the buyer, if not preceded by performance
of the terms of the escrow, is of no effict on the seller's title.2 6
In this situation a fortiori the grantor succeeds against a pur-
chaser from the grantee with notice,27 or the grantee himself . 2
In Neal v. Pickett2 9 there had been no performance but the
depositary had delivered the deed on the express acquiescence of the
grantor. Held, title passed subject to a right in the grantor to avoid
the deed on proof of non-performance, that is, on proof of a mis-
take of fact.
In Yantis v. Parker"° the ultimate escrow event was said to be
performance by the buyer followed by delivery to the buyer. Hence
performance by a third party and the obtaining of the deed by him
for the grantee, did not pass title to such grantee so as to validate
a later conveyance from the grantee to such third person. The
grantor had a rightA not merely to the money, but to such money
paid by a certain person.
A deed, containing a warranty against encumbrances "at the
time of delivery," placed in escrow, operates from the time of
delivery to the grantee and hence the state of tax liens at thai time
26, Binglam v. Taylor 12 Fed. (2nd) 15; Los Angeles City H. S. Dist. v.Quinn 234 Pac. (Cal.) 313; Weghorst v. Clark 180 Pac. (Colo.) 742; Hous-
ton v. Forman 109 So. (Fla.) 297; Evans v. McKinney 308 I11. 100; Houston
v. Adams 95 So. (Fla.) 859; Bergstrom v. Durhamn 181 N. W. (Minn.) 343;
Otero v. Albuquerque 158 Pac. (N. M.) 798; Wood v. French 39 Okla. 685.
In Tyler Bldg. & L. Assm. v. Beard 106 Tex. 554, the court seems to have
held that if the transaction was an escrow, the wrongful delivery of the deed
would give the grantee power to transfer title to a bona fide purchaser.
27. Tutt v. Smith 200 N. W. (Ia.) 187; Morris v. Blunt 35 Utah 194.
28. Otero v. Albuquerque 158 Pac. (N. M.) 798; but see Rohrbacher v.
Wright 195 Pac. (Ore.) 343, where the fault, if any, was solely that of the
depositary. The court indicated that in such a situation the innocent grantee
should be protected, probably on the ground of estoppel against the grantor
who had left a deed with name of grantee blank in the possession of the
depositary.
29. 280 S. W. (Tex.) 748.
30. 237 Pac. (Okla.) 127.
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determines the grantor's liability on his warranty. Delivery means
"second delivery," sometimes so called.31
Some recent cases have supported the position that a title passes
on performance by the buyer, even, though delivery of the deed is
postponed. Thus, in a recent Indiana case an insurance policy on
the grantor's house was held to have been invalidated under the
"change in interest" clause by performance of the escrow condi-
tion by the grantee, although the deed had not been handed to the
grantee prior to the fire. The court said that the grantee got at
least an "equitable interest," if not the legal title.
3 2
A deed of land to a hotel company, placed in escrow until the
completion of the hotel, has been held to create a completed gift to
the company as of the date of the construction of the hotel, al-
though the company did not get possession of the instrument until
later. The nature of the title in the escrow grantee, as legal or
equitable, was not discussed.3 - The gift validated a subscription
contract which was subject to a condition precedent that the land
be given to the hotel corporation.
In Neal v. Owings34 an escrow grantee who had performed
was held entitled to proceed in equity to compel the depositary to
deliver a deed, the court saying that the performance gave him an
"equitable title."
There are strong authorities to the effect that performance of
the condition passes legal title to the grantee, without a handing
of the deed to him. 5
It thus appears that in the escrow there is undesirable uncertainty
as to the event or events which must occur before legal title passes
to the buyer. The best considered view is that the performance
of the contract accomplishes passage of legal title to the vendee
and that transmission of the deed is a formality necessary merely
to give evidence of title. But there are numerous expressions from
authoritative sources that until performance and delivery of the
deed, to the buyer, the escrow is incomplete, and that mere per-
formance gives the buyer an equitable title only. These state-
ments are based on the primitive idea that delivery means the
31. McMurtrey v. Bridges 41 Okla. 264; and see Wood v. Moreth 90
So. (Miss.) 714.
32. Farmers' Mit. F. . Co. v. Olson 129 N. E. (Ind.) 234. And see
dictum in accord, in Tanier v. Inle 253 S. W. (Tex.) 665, 667.
33. Val. Verde Hotel Co. v. Ross 231 Pac. (N. M.) 702.
34. 194 Pac. (Kan.) 324.
35. See Aigler "Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow?"
Mich. L. R. 16: 569, 578.
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passing of an instrument from hand to hand. Whether one accepts
the concept that an escrow means delayed delivery or delayed pas-
sage of property, the" occurrence of the escrow event should effect
completion, that is, either secure delivery or result in legal property
passing.
This uncertainty would not exist in a trust. There unassail-
able legal title would not pass to the grantee-cestui que trust until
performance by him and the execution and delivery of a deed by the
trustee to the grantee. The performance of his contract by the
grantee would give him a clear-cut, equitable right to proceed in
chancery to force the trustee to give a deed; the execution and de-
livery of a deed by the trustee to the grantee without the perform-
ance of the contract would pass legal title, but the grantor-cestui
que trust could set aside the conveyance or hold the grantee as a
constructive trustee. There would seem to be no opportunity for
doubt as to the rights of the! grantee or grantor in any given situ-
ation.
LEGAL RELATION OF THE DEPOSITARY
What is the relation of the escrow depositary to grantor and
grantee? Is he an agent for them jointly, an agent of each sep-
arately, a trustee, a bailee, in some other position, or in some cases
in one relationship and in other cases in another?
A recent California case describes him as "the agent of both
parties" prior to performance of the condition and thereafter an
agent for the grantor as to the consideration to be paid to him,
and an agent of the grantee as to the deed to be delivered to him. 8
Therefore, prior to performance, the risk of loss as to a bad check
given by the depositary to the grantor as a transmittal of funds
paid by the grantee to the depositary, fell on the grantee. It would
seem that if the custodian were at this time the agent of both, any
loss caused by his misconduct should rest upon them equally.
Another case arising out of the misdeeds of the same deposi-
tary is Hildebrand, v. Beck,37 where the grantee was held not en-
titled to possession of the land, although he had paid the depositary
the full balance due on the price and thus done all that he could
to perform the condition on which the deed was to be delivered
and to take effect. The depositary had, prior to the furnishing of
a certificate of title by the grantor, embezzled the money paid him
36. Shreeves v. Pearson 230 Pac. (Cal.) 448.
37. 236 Fac. (Cal.) 301.
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by the grantee, and did not give the grantor his (the depositary's)
own check for the amount due the grantor. The grantor had au-
thorized the custodian to deposit the grantee's checks in the de-
positary's bank account and to pay the grantor by the depositary's
own check. The court held that this made the depositary a trustee
of the grantee's check and its proceeds for the grantee until the
grantor furnished a certificate of title, and that the embezzlement
had occurred prior to the furnishing of such certificate and conse-
quently the loss was a loss of trust funds held for the vendee.
The Shreeves case was decided on principles of agency, the
1lildebrand case on doctrines of trust, although in both the deposi-
tary had a right to place the grantee's check in the depositary's
bank account and .pay the grantor by the despositary's check. There
had been no full performance of the escrow conditions at the time
the rights were fixed in either case. It would seem that the re-
sult should have been worked out on the same theory in both cases,
namely, on the theory that the despositary was an agent of the
grantee with a duty to pay the grantor from the depositary's own
funds the amount advanced to the depositary by the grantee. In-
stead the court held the custodian arf agent for both parties in the
first case and a trustee for the grantee only in the second case.
Loss due to the default of a joint agent should be distributed.
There was no evidence that the depositary in either case was to
hold separate any property for the purpose of satisfying his duty
to pay the grantor, so that it is impossible for the writer to under-
stand how the depositary could be held a trustee.
In Smith v. Griffith3" the depositary delivered the deed to the
grantee on the payment of a sum smaller than the amount due.
The grantee claimed that the depositary was the grantor's agent
to deliver the deed and hence that the principal was bound by
the agent's act and that title passed to the grantee. The court
said (p. 726) :
"A depositary is always something more or something less than an
ordinary agent, and accuracy permits us to say no more than that the
depositary is an intermediary between vendor and vendee, having the
special powers created by the escrow agreement, and no others."
Hence the unauthorized delivery did not bind the grantor. Does
this mean that the depositary is a peculiar or special kind of agent
or that he is not an agent at all, but rather an "intermediary" sui
38. 184 Pac. (Kan.) 725.
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generis, whose powers are fixed by the facts of each individual
case?
In Parker State Bank v. Pennington3" an escrow grantee de-
livered his checks to the depositary with permission to cash the
checks and mix the proceeds with the depositary's general funds.
There was no duty to keep the checks or their proceeds separate
and turn one or the other over to the grantor. And yet the court
held the depositary a "trustee of an express trust" for the grantee
and so liable for breach of trust when it delivered money to the
grantor without performance of his part of the escrow agree-
ment, although the depositary could not, the court said, have been
held liable on the theory of a conversion of the grantee's prop-
erty because of the lack of any specific property of the grantee
to be converted. If the res was sufficiently specific to allow a
trust, it would seem that it was definite enough to permit of a
recovery in conversion, if there were found a legal interest. But
there does not seem to have been any definite property to act as a
trust subject or as the thing converted. The defendant bank was
not obliged to and did not set apart any particular part of its assets
for the satisfaction of its obligation to the grantee. It merely
was under a contractual duty to him, for the breach of which he
ought to have been allowed to collect damages from the depos-
itary.40
Doubtless an escrow depositary may be a bailee of deed and
money; or a trustee of title and money or either; or a bailee of
the deed and the general owner of the money paid by the grantee
to him, with merely contractual obligations as to making payments
to the grantor. One confusing element in the escrow cases is
that there is frequently an assumption that the depositary occupies
the same relationship in all escrow cases. It is unfortunate that
the parties should be uncertain as to which of two or three different
relationships the depositary will occupy as to deed or money, and
that while they may intend to make him an agent, for example,
he may at the end of expensive litigation turn up in the livery
of a trustee.
Contrasting the conveyancing trust with the escrow at this
point, we find the advantage all on the side of the trust. The
nature of a trust and remedies of the cestui que trust are all
39. 9 Fed. (2d) 966.
40. For another recent affirmation of the doctrine that the escrow deposi-
tary is a trustee of an express trust, see Seibel v. Higlham 216 Mo. 121, 132.
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well fixed. The duties of the trustee of any particular real prop-
erty trust will necessarily, if the Statute of Frauds is satisfied,
be reduced to written certainty and the terms will define the ex-
tent of the interest of grantor' and grantee-cestui que trust at
all times. The divided ownership will be frankly recognized as to
size and equitable nature. Each will have an equitable interest
in the land and the grantor in the payments made by the grantee
to the trustee.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE ADMITTED RESULTS OF ESCROWS
The inconveniences last considered arise out of the uncer-
tainty as to the exact legal theory and effects of an escrow. There
are also qualities of the escrow which- the courts agree always
follow the deposit of the deed, but which, it seems to the writer, are
objectionable or unfair to one party or another.
It is familiar law that parol evidence will not be received
to show that delivery of a deed to the grantee was conditional. The
escrow depositary must be a person other than grantor or grantee.
Numerous examples are to be found in recent years of alleged
attempted escrows with the grantee as holder of the deed, where
the result has been that the delivery has been held absolute and
the title irrevocably vested in the grantee.41
Doubtless in some of these transactions there was no real con-
dition and the rule prevented a possible invalidating of the deed
through perjured testimony. But it seems certain that in other
cases ther was a real agreement for conditional delivery and
the expectation of the grantor was disappointed and his intent
frustrated. In City National Bank v. Anderson 2 the deed was put
41. Roach v. A. D. Malone M. Co. 204 S. W. (Ark.) 971; Watson v.
Chandler, 133 Ky. 757; Kennan v. Trenton 130 Tenn. 71; Springfield Ins. Co.
v. Morgan 202 S. W. (Tex.) 784k Manton v. City of Antonio 207 S. W.
(Tex.) 951; Parker v. Sorell 230 S. W. (Tex.) 819; Woods v. Rolls 268
S. W. (Tex.) 988;, Heck v. Morgan 106 S. E. (W. Va.) 413; Hensley v.
Swann 115 S. E. (W. Va.) 864. In Ininan v. Quirley 194 S. W. (Ark.) 858,
the court made a fine distinction in order to escape this intent-frustrating
rule, and in Ball v. Sandlin 176 Ky. 537, to avoid the rule the grantee was
found to have had the deed for safe-keeping only. And see Hotaling v.
Hotaling 224 Pac. (Calif.) 455, where the rule was avoided by holding that
although the grantee had possession of the deed, it had not been placed in
his hands with the intent requisite to delivery. In Mitchell v. Clen 295 Ill.
150 the court escaped in a hard case by finding from oral evidence that there
was no delivery at all, although possession of the deed was given to the
grantee. See comment in Col. L. R. 21: 381; Mich. L. R. 19: 563. See
Ballantine "Delivery in Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule," Yale L. J.
29: 826.
42. 189 Ky. 487.
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in the grantee's hands on condition that if the grantee did not com-
plete his payments, the deed should be returned. There was a
default and the deed was returned. Both parties admitted the
condition and sought to enforce it but the law prevented them
and held absolute title had vested in the grantee, so that his creditors
could take the land.
It may be said that if the grantor desires to suspend the
operation of the deed by an escrow he should obey the law and
select a third party depositary. But the point remains that it is
a common opinion among layman that there may be a conditional
delivery to a grantee. This technical rule of escrows, founded
on legal logic rather than on common sense, deceives many per-
sons who, seek to establish an escrow. They ought not to be
deceived, but they are deceived. They are presumed to know the
law but they do not know it. The question of delivery or no
delivery is settled by oral evidence. Why, thinks the layman, may
not the question of absolute or conditional delivery be also thus
settled? Conditional delivery to a third party may be shown by
parol evidence Why 'hot to the grantee? Instruments other
than deeds may be delivered to a party conditionally. Why not
a deed? There are technical legal reasons for these differences
but they are not readily understood by a layman. That the rule
does not accord with modern: ideas is shown by the distinctly
observable tendency of the courts to abandon the rule in the case of
sealed instruments not concerned with land.43  Any conveyancing
device which does not have this trap attached to it will, other
things being equal, have an advantage over the escrow. Admittedly
the trust is free from such a danger. No grantor would be apt
to make a grantee a trustee for the purpose of the conveyance,
but if he did no difficulty would arise. A grantor may make
a grantee trustee for grantor and grantee, for the purpose of
holding for both until the grantee performs his contract and then
conveying to the grantee. Equity recognizes that the trustee and
grantee-cestui que trust are separate legal entities, although they
have the same name,
Further intent-defeating refinements are displayed in deciding
whether the depositary may have previously or presently the re-
lationship of agent for one of the parties, or must be a person
having no relation to the grantor or grantee other than that
of depositary. It may be argued that if the depositary is in some
43. Whitaker v. Lane 104 S. E. (Va.) 252; Mich. L. R. 19: 343.
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other capacity exclusively the agent of the grantor, it is the same
as if the grantor had kept the deed in his own hands; and if the
depositary is by some contract outside the escrow the exclusive
agent of the grantee for some other purpose, it may be urged that
there is an attempted conditional delivery to the grantee which
results in absolute delivery.
In a recent Minnesota case44 the agent of the seller to procure
a purchaser was held to be a proper depositary, the court saying
"Such is the modern doctrine, on facts like those here presented,
though by the earlier cases a different rule prevailed."
Yet we find a Kentucky court recently stating that "an in-
strument cannot be delivered in escrow to a depositary who is
exclusively the agent of either party" ;45 while in New Jersey the
old rule seems to be abrogated to the extent that an attorney
for either party may be a depositary, the court saying that there
"was nothing in his [the attorney's] employment by defendants
[grantors] which made the escrow by its terms antagonistic to
their interests."4 6 This lack of antagonism would seem to make the
depositary so much more the alter ego of the grantor and thus
disqualified to act as an intermediary.
A not inconsiderable amount of litigation appears to have been
necessary to draw the line between an escrow depositary and others
somewhat similarly situated. Thus, in Miller v. Smith,47 a bank was
held to be the grantee's exclusive agent and not a depositary, and
hence the deed was effective although a condition fixed by the
grantor had not been performed. In Nelson v. Davis48 the deeds
were put in the hands of a disinterested third party pending a
decision by the parties whether they would exchange. This was
held not an escrow. In Kanner v. Start 49 a third party had
possession of exchange deeds but there was no escrow because
he was an agent of each to receive immediate delivery and to
attach revenue stamps. In Aggers v. Blackburn50 there was a
handing to the grantee to turn the deed over to the depositary
44. Henry v. Hutchins 178 N. W. (Minn.) 807, 809. But see Van Val-
kenburg v. Allen 111 Minn. 333, where the grantee's agent was said not to be
qualified as a custodian.
45. Home Insurance Co. v. Wilson 275 S. W. (Ky.) 691, 693.
46. Kelly v. Chinich 108 Atl. (N. J.) 372.
47. 205 Pac. (Wash.) 386.
48. 172 Pac. (Wash.) 1178.
49. 203 S. W. (Tex.) 603.
50. 230 S. W. (Tex.) 424.
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and no escrow when the grantee did not carry out the under-
standing."'
In Schmidt v. Baer52 it was necessary to decide whether the
handing to the third party was for safekeeping or as an escrow.
In H argett v. Hargett3 the escrow failed because of a delivery
to the grantor's agent, while in Harris v. Geneva Mill Company"
and Roach V. A. D. Malone Company 5 the difficulty was whether
the third party was not disqualified as an escrow despositary be-
cause he was the grantee's agent.
The grantor must part with control of the escrow deed, that is,
abandon all right to its return to him, unless the escrow condition
is not in due time performed." This opens a gate for evasion of an
escrow by oral proof that, while all other elements of an escrow are
present, the grantor orally stipulated for a right to control the deed,
and thus vitiated the escrow. 57
The contract preceding the escrow must be absolute and uncon-
ditional. Consequently if both contract and deed are put in escrow,
there is not a valid escrow of the deed. 58
It is evident that such delicate distinctions are a source of fact
dispute and misconstruction of the law. Sometimes they prevent
fruition of a genuinely intended escrow and give the grantee abso-
lute title. On other occasions they require extended litigation to
quiet a contention that the're was an escrow when in reality none
was intended. They encourage the breaking of contracts under pre-
texts. They constitute snares in the way of business men. In the
real property conveyancing trust the trustee may be any person,59
regardless of his other relationships to the parties. The trust will
be unmistakably created by formal papers, delivered and recorded.
The opportunity to confuse such a trust relationship with another
similar connection is but slight.
NEcEssITY FOR FORMAL CONTRACT TO CONVEY
Another deceptive feature of escrow law is the widespread rule
that in order to have an enforcible escrow there must be a preceding
51. For a similar case see Ford v. McCoy 276 S. W. (Ark.) 595.
52. 283 S. W. (Tex.) 1115.
53. 78 So. (Ala.) 865.
54. 95 So. (Ala.) 622.
55. 204 S. W. (Ark.) 971.
56. Chaffin v. Harphant 266 S. W. (Ark.) 685.
57. Peters v. Strauss 63 Tex. Civ. App. 118; Seiffert v. Lanz 29 N. D.
139.
58. Lewis v. Rouse 240 Pac. (Ariz.) 275.
59. Subject to the restrictions on the powers of artificial legal persons.
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contract to sell which satisfies the requirements of the fourth section
of the Statute of Frauds. Although the parties may well think
that the transaction has passed beyond the contract stage when the
deed is placed in escrow, and that all formal requirements are met
by the deed itself, one or the other is not infrequently enabled to
withdraw from the escrow, without any justifiable reason, upon set-
ting up the informal nature of the contract of sale.60 For example,
in Main v. Pratt6 ' the grantor's heir admitted the escrow, but was
allowed to take back the deed because of the lack of prior formal
contract.
It is not intended here to examine the merits of this rule as a
legal doctrine. The matter has been well discussed by learned au-
thors. 62 The point of the writer is that this rule does not harmonize
with the practical judgment of business men and that frequent in-
justice results from its operation. Parties think, and are entitled
to think, that the negotiations have resulted in an executed trans-
action when the deed has been made out and irrevocably deposited
to await an event, and that the time for raising objections to the
preliminary contract on the ground of its informality has passed.
This difficulty and chance for frustrated intent will surely be
avoided by the trust for conveyancing purposes. There the deeding
of the property by the grantor to the trustee to hold for the grantor
and the grantee (the event corresponding to the deposit of the deed
in escrow) is obviously an executed transaction which removes from
the realm of practical dispute the question whether the contract by
the grantor to convey to the trustee was formal or informal.
Admitting that the escrow requires a valid preceding contract,
may the deed itself be used as evidence to satisfy the Statute of
60. Holland v. McCarthy 160 Pac. (Calif.) 1069; Elliott v. Title Ins. &
Tr. Co. 222 Pac. (Calif.) 175; Main v. Pratt 276 Ill. 218; Briggs v. Watson 139
N. E. (Ind.) 197; Davis v. Brigham 56 Ore. 41 (but see Foulkes v. Seng-
slacken 83 Ore. 118; Jozefowicz v. Leickem 182 N. W. (Wis.) 729. Man-
ning v. Foster 49 Wash. 541, required no formal preceding contract, but in
Nelson v. Davis 172 Pac. (Wash.) 1178 it was said that the rule was doubt-
ful in Washington, and the court seems to have overruled the Manning case
in AMcLau v. Healv 98 Wash. 489. See notes on the McLain case in Yale
L. J. 27: 699; Mich. L. R. 16: 197. Contra to the weight of authority, see
Schurtz v. Colvin 55 Oh. St. 274; Blight v. Schenck 10 Pa. St. 285.
In some states the escrow deed is held to be sufficient formality and no
preceding written contract is required. Eason v. Walker 246 Pac. (Okla.)
865; Ullendorf v. Graham 87 So. (Fla.) 50. See Aigler "Is a Contract Nec-
essary to Create an Effective Escrow?" Mich. L. R. 16: 569. Kelsey "Deeds
in Escrow under the Statute of Frauds" Banking Law Jour. 29:976.
61. 276 Ill. 218.
62. Aigler "Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow?"
Mich. L R. 16: 569; Bigelow Harv. L. R. 26: 565; Tiffany "Conditional
Delivery of Deeds" Columb. Law Rev. 14:389, 398.
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Frauds as to the formality of the contract to convey? Frequently
it is sufficient, but sometimes not. 63 Ordinarily deeds and leases do
not describe in detail the terms of the contracts which preceded them,
and it is not desirable that they should be encumbered with such
minutiae.
WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION
What of the relative ease of withdrawal and restoration to statu
quo? After the placing of the deed in escrow the buyer may fail
to make his payments and the seller. may desire to resume possession
of the deed, destroy it, and wipe the slate clean. He is entitled to
demand back the deed from the depositary, 64 and very little litigation
seems to have resulted from inability of the grantor to get his deed
back. In the possession of the depositary it would not be operative
on the title after the time for the buyer's performance had passed,
but would give scope for possible fraud on third parties by the de-
positary in wrongfully delivering or recording it. But the existence
and especially the recording of the contract of sale may put the seller
to considerable expense and delay in foreclosing the equities of the
defaulting buyer. Often and perhaps generally retention by the
seller of the part payments may be guaranteed by provisions for the
forfeiture of part payments, treatment of them as liquidated dam-
ages, rent, etc. ;65 but such forfeiture provisions must be carefully
drawn and sometimes are not successful. There may be a record of
the contract which does not automatically disappear from the books
on the buyer's default. Actions to clear up the title by decree of
court are not uncommon. 66 The courts often give the buyer a re-
demption period which delays the clearance of title.
63. Supple v. Wheeler 178 N. W. (Mich.) 96. semble; Tozwnsend v. Day
224 S. W.- (Tex.) 283; Pearson v. Fitzgerald 225 S. W. (Tex.) 407; Day v.
Towmsend 238 S. W. (Tex.) 213; Simpson v. Green 231 S. W. (Tex.) 375.
But in Blue v. Conner 218 S. W. (Tex.) 533, the lease was held insufficient
for lack of terms, and in McLain v. Healy 98 Wash. 489, the deed was held
to be an insufficient memorandum. That the separate written instructions
of buyer and seller to the depositary may be read together to make a mem-
orandum of the contract of sale, was held in Tuso v. Green 239 Pac. (Calif.)
327, noted in Cal. L. R. 13: 361.
64. Grimm v. Willians 200 S. W. (Tex.) 1119.
65. Danziger v. Benson 166 Pac. (Cal.) 313; Gambrell v. Tatum 228
S. W. (Tex.)'287; Quinlan v. St. John 201 Pac. (Wyo.) 149. "The ten-
dency of the law is to deny to a defaulting vendee reimbursement .
Statutory provisions are badly needed to give purchasers of land and chat-
tels more effective protection against forfeiture." Ballantine "Forfeiture for
Breach of Contract" Minn. L. R. 5: 329, 349, 350.
66. Neher v. Kauffiman 242 Pac. (Cal.) 713; McPherson v. Barbour 183
Pac. (Ore.) 752; Anderson v. Morse 222 Pac. (Ore.) 1083.
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If the trust falls through, due to default of the buyer, there is
a disinterested third party, the trustee, who can, and is under a duty
to, clear up the seller's title by a deed back to the seller. This deed
can, of course, be recorded. The intermediary in the escrow case has
no power to execute any instrument which will clear the record and
discharge the equity, and the buyer who could execute a release of
the recorded contract may not do so. He may deem himself un-
justly treated and claim an equity in the land.
In some escrows there .is an unfortunate tendency to separate
the buyer's performance from the seller's and, to require the buyer
to make his payments in full before he can have any action against
the seller based on breaches" of the seller's obligations. Thus, in one
case,6 7 the escrowed deed had a covenant against encumbrances. The
buyer learned of an encumbrance, paid the depositary the amount
due, less the amount of the encumbrance, and persuaded the deposi-
tary to deliver the deed. Held, that the act of the buyer was wrong-
ful and the seller could recover damages for it, since the deed had
no effect until the buyer paid the full price and there was thus no
cause of action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances at
the time the buyer made his deduction. This defeats justice. See
"also Craig v. White," where the buyer had to make payments to the
seller before the title examination was completed and on proof of
defect in the title had to sue the seller to get such payments back.
In a trust to accomplish the same result, this difficulty would not
arise because the title would have to be cleared of encumbrances at
the time of the transfer to the trustee, or if left encumbered the
amount to be paid by the grantee to the trustee would be corre-
spondingly reduced. The existence and effect of the encumbrance
would be settled prior to the fixing of the terms between buyer and
seller. All rights would be thrown into the melting pot of the trust
and a general adjustment authorized.
THE "RELATION BACK" THEORY
The artificial "relation back" theory of the escrow is a weak-
ness. The courts have held in substance that the deed ordinarily
takes effect from the time of the performance, or performance and
second delivery, but that if it is necessary to-accomplish justice they
will treat the deed as having operated as of the date of the delivery
to the depositary, on the theory that the title related back from the
67. Griffln v. Gay 232 Ill. App. 39.
68. 202 Pac. (Cal.) 648.,
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date of the second delivery to that of the first.09 This rule gives
rise to another uncertainty. When is it to be considered that justice
and equity cannot be accomplished without applying the doctrine of
relation? Furthermore, it involves a fiction to accomplish a desired
end. It is much better to use methods, if such are available, which
reach the same result without strain or invention.7 0
If a deed is put in escrow to await the delivery of a mortgage
by grantee to depositary, and the grantor dies before the mortgage
is made and delivered, is the grantee entitled to tender a mortgage
to the successors of the grantor and demand performance? The
general holding is in the affirmative,7 1 but sometimes the grantor's
death renders performance of the condition impossible and so sub-
sequent tender will be ineffective.7
2
Shall the second delivery cause relationship back so as to cut
off dower in a widow of the grantor who married him during the
escrow period? A minor court in Pennsylvania has answered yes,73
and there is a similar decision in Indiana as to the effect of a deed
to be delivered on the death of the grantor;74 but this latter decision
is opposed to the view of a Vermont court.7 1
Shall the relation back cut off the rights of creditors of the
grantor who have docketed their judgments during the escrow pe-
riod? A North Carolina court has said yes,7 6 but an Oregon court
considers the title divided between grantor and grantee in accord-
ance with the amount due, and does not shut out the grantor's
creditors.
77
If a trust is used instead of an escrow, there will be divided
equitable ownership in the land from the date of the conveyance to
the trustee. The grantor's interest will be gauged by what is due
him; the grantee's by the value of the realty less what is due the
69. Jackson v. Jackson 67 Ore. 44.
70. See, for example, the difficulties which the courts have found with
the doctrine of relation back in title by adverse possession and by satisfaction
of judgment, where benefits have accrued or burdens attached in the inter-
vening period. Bryan v. Weems 29 Ala. 157; White v. Martin 1 Porter
(Ala.) 215; Bacon v. Kimmel 14 Mich. 201.
71. Van Tassel v. Burgen 119 N. Y. App. Div. 509. And see Foulkes v.
Sengstacken 83 Ore. 118. While the escrow relates back to sustain the deed
of the deceased grantor, it does not operate to make the purchase price per-
sonal property. The grantor is deemed to have died the owner of the land
as far as the distribution of its proceeds is concerned. Van Tassel v. Burgen
supra.
72. McIntyre v. McIntyre 147 Mich. 365.
73. Vorheis v. Kitch 8 Phila. 554.
74. Smiley v. Smiley 114 Ind. 758.
75. Ladd v. Ladd 14 Vt. 185.
76. Hall v. Harris 40 N. C. 303.
77. May v. Emerson 52 Ore. 262.
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grantor. The qualities of such equitable interests are well known.
They may ordinarily be bought and sold, taken for the debts of
their owners, and are subject to dower and curtesy. The death
of the grantor or the grantee will merely change the ownership of
the equitable interests and not disarrange the execution of the
trust. By the joinder of the husband or wife of the grantor in the
deed to the trustee and by the making of husband or wife of both the
grantor and the grantee parties to the trust instrument, it would
seem that curtesy and dower in the equitable interests of the
cestuis que trust could be so controlled as to cause the trustee no
undue difficulty of administration. To simplify matters some trust
companies insert clauses in the trust instrument to the effect that
the interests of the cestuis que trust shall at all times be treated
as interests in personalty. This clause has recently been sustained
by the Illinois Supreme Court7 8 in a decision where the question
was whether a freehold interest in land was involved so as to give
the Supreme Court jurisdiction.
ADAPTABILITY oF EsCROWS AND TRUSTS
It is desirable that the interests of seller and buyer in an ex-
ecutory conveyancing transaction be freely transferable by way of
sale or mortgage. Here there is little difference between escrow
and trust. The escrow grantor's interest is freely alienable, 9 and
so is that of the escrow grantee.80 One court has adopted a rule
similar to that of Dearle v. Hall,8' namely, that notice to the de-
positary is necessary to protect the assignee of the grantee's interest
against the'effect of action by the depositary taken in ignorance of
the assignment. 82 The same court would probably apply the rule
78. Lill v. Duncanson (Oct. 1926) 322 Ill. 528. The following is a
quotation from the certificate issued to the beneficiary under the so-called
MacChesney trust plan, prepared by Nathan William MacChesney of Chi-
cago: "And it is expressly agreed that the holder hereof has no claim or
interest, legal or equitable, in the lands and other assets and property described
and referred to in said trust agreement, but only an interest in the net avails
or proceeds thereof as in said instrument provided." And the trust instru-
ment under such plan provides: "Neither of the beneficiaries nor the com-
pany has, nor at any time shall have any right, title or interest in or to any
portion of the Trust Estate as such, but each has only an interest in the
proceeds aforesaid; it being the intention of this instrument to recognize the
vesting of full legal and equitable title to the trust estate in the Trustee."
The clauses in the Duncanson trust were very similar.
79. Foxley v. Rich 35 Utah 162. The grantor's creditor can attach his
interest. Knapp v. Andrus 180 Pac. (Mont.) 908.
80. .rarvis v. Chanslor & Lyon Co. 177 Pac. (Ariz.) 27.
81. 3 Russel Ch. Rep. 1.
82. Le Porin v. State Exch. Bk. 213 Pac. (Kan.) 650.
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of Dearle v. Hall to the assignment of the interest of a cestui que
trust.
The rights of grantor-cestui que trust and grantee-cestui que
trust under a conveyancing trust are doubtless freely transferable.
It is customary to provide in the trust instrument that the assign-
ment shall not be effective against the trustee until written notice,
signed by the assignor, has been deposited with the trustee.
The escrow seems better adapted to property which is to re-
main static during the escrow period than to land which is to be
improved pending the obtaining of deed and title. In the absence
of express agreement or special circumstances the defaulting buyer
under a mere land contract or land contract plus escrow will lose
the value of the improvements he has made.
83
The prudent buyer will want title before he builds. Both land
contract and the conveyancing trust can give the defaulting vendee
an equity because of improvements made. The advantage of the
trust lies in the necessity for some statement on the subject of the
trustee's duty in all contingencies. The land contract may more
easily exist without any mention of the buyer's equities in case of
default.
The trust has been frequently used in Chicago, Toledo and
other cities as a means of consummating subdivision transfers in-
volving three sets of parties, the so-called "acre-owner" whose land
is to be turned into suburban lots, the "subdivider" or promoter who
is to put in improvements, advertise, and negotiate sales of the lots,
and the lot buyers. The trust has been very successfully used in
securing collection and proper distribution of the lot sale payments,
the prompt delivery to lot purchasers of deeds conveying title free
of encumbrances at the completion of their payments, and the per-
formance of the subdivider's obligations regarding advertising
and improvements. The original acreage is usually subject to a mort-
gage when the deal is commenced and the mortgagee may exchange
his mortgage for an equity under the trust and a right to part of
the proceeds of lot sales until he is paid off, with a provision for
restoration of his mortgage in case of the subdivider's default.
This puts a clear fee in the trustee and gives the lot buyer (often
a poor and ignorant individual) much needed protection. A recent
Ohio case 84 gives many details of this trust arrangement. The
reason why that trust gave rise to litigation was its lack of provi-
sion for certain features of the transaction which gave cause for
83. Quinlan v. St. John 201 Pac. (Wyo.) 149.
84. Lasich v. Ohio Say. Bk. & Trust Co. 152 N. E. (Ohio) 394
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dispute between the trust company on the one side and the acre-
owner and subdivider on the other. In Chicago dozens of these
subdivision trusts have been carried through without litigation or
serious trouble.
An Oregon case 5 illustrates an attempt to finance a subdivision
near a small city by land contract and escrow methods.. A con-
tracte4t to sell to B a tract of land which was to be subdivided by
B. "The latter was to find lot purchasers and A was to escrow
with a bank deeds to the lots running from A to the several lot,
buyers, which deeds were to be delivered as the lot buyers made
their payments. B defaulted after making some payments to A.
A brought suit to foreclose B's contract and have it declared that
B's payments were forfeited. The court allowed those who had
contracted for lots to proceed, complete their payments, and get
their deeds out of escrow; and foreclosed B of his rights if he
did not complete his payments within one year. It required a rather
liberal administration of equity to accomplish this very fair result.
A more technical court might have held that the only equities which
ran against the land in A's hands were those of B and that these
equities in th, entire tract might be foreclosed regardless of what
the lot purchasers did as to their several lots. The Oregon court
created equities against A's land, arising out of contracts made
between B and the lot buyers. Technically such sub-contracts
would attach equities to B's interests only.
A subdivision trust would have separated each lot contracted
to be sold, created equities in that lot in favor of acre-owner, sub-
divider and lot purchaser, and made the lot buyer's default the only
basis for forfeiture of his equity.
A further advantage of trusts over escrows for subdivision
purposes is the freedom of trusts from the bothersome defenses
of want of mutuality, lack of consideration, and lack of privity
of contract, which at least to a small extent and occasionally lie
in wait for parties who seek to get specific performance of land
contracts."" In actions for specific performance of contracts where
the plaintiff is a lot purchaser who has had no direct relation with
the acre-owner or trustee and now claims a deed from the trustee,
there is at least a slight danger of a successful defense on the
ground that, while the defendant was obligated to sell, the plaintiff
was not bound to buy, and hence there was no mutuality in the
contract sought to be enforced; or that no consideration ran from
85. McPherson v. Barbour 183 Pac. (Ore.) 752.
86. 36 Cyc. 544, 621.
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the plaintiff to the defendant; or that the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary to the contract between the acre-owner and the sub-
divider. Such defenses were raised in the Lasich case87 on the
theory that that action was one for specific performance and not
to enforce a trust. The court was somewhat troubled by these
defenses but set them aside, on one ground or another, without
definitely holding that the bill was one to enforce a trust, which
latter result would have been a short and definitive disposal. The
beneficiary of a trust need not be obligated to the trustee at all.
Lack of mutuality is unheard of as a defense to a bill to enforce
a trust. Neither the cestui que trust, nor anyone else, need furnish
to the trustee consideration, in order to make the trust enforcible.
And the cestui que trust need not be a party to any trust instru-
ment or any contract to create the trust, in order to enable him to
enforce the trust.
OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF THE TRUST
It will doubtless be said that the trust as a conveyancing device
is suited to large and valuable tracts only and is too expensive, com-
plex and cumbersome for other properties.
The expense is probably slightly greater than that of the ordi-
nary escrow. According to the form used in McNeill v. Pappas8
the escrow grantor bore the cost of the following items: certificate
of title, revenue stamps on deed, drawing deed, insurance-transfer
fee, and escrow fee. The drafting and recording of one more deed
would seem, however, to be the principal extra item. In the care-
fully conducted escrow the drafting of written escrow instructions
will be as burdensome and expensive as the preparation of a trust
instrument. The duties of administration will be the same under
escrow or trust. It may be, however, that, practically, many es-
crow depositaries are paid nothing for holding papers and money,
receiving and paying out money and delivering the deed. 9 Country
banks and real estate agents doubtless often render this service
gratuitously as an incident of their other business. A trustee to
do the same work would be entitled to commissions at the statutory
rate unless the trust instrument fixed the compensation. An in-
quiry of the Chicago Title and Trust Company as to the relative
87. Supra, note 84.
88. 241 Pac. (Cal) 897.
89. The writer is informed that many California title companies on the
issuance of title policies render escrow service free. This is doubtless one
reason for the common use of the escrow there.
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expense of the trust and escrow where realty is to be conveyed and
payments are to run over a period of one year reveals the following
comparative costs:
Escrow Trust
$ 10,000 deal .................... $ 22 $ 66
100,000 deal ..................... 100 250
Another objection to the trust for this purpose is that in towns
and small cities there are no professional trustees, no trust compa-
nies, and parties will hesitate to use an individual as trustee. Small
state banks probably do not generally have capacity to act as trus-
tee, whereas they have been the common escrow depositaries in the
escrow litigation of the past twenty years, but national banks may
receive from the federal reserve bank authority to act as trustee.90
This is undoubtedly an objection of some slight weight. The pro-
fessional trustee is much safer than the casual. The difficulty might
be relieved to some extent by giving to state banks the power to
act as trustee.
A further practical reason why it may be difficult to supplant
the long term escrow with the conveyancing trust is that the self-
interest of the broker stands in the way. His leading thought is
to close the deal and get his commission. He himself may be
allowed to act as escrow depositary under an agreement that first
payments are to go to him in satisfaction of his commission. He
is not apt to desire to be a trustee, or to be desired as such. Trusts
to convey generally give the commission priority also, but there is
the difference between being one's own paymaster and confiding in
another. The realtors may very naturally prefer to lead the parties
into an escrow with the broker as depositary and thus to retain the
maximum of control. 91 Whether the realtor is strictly speaking
disqualified as an escrow custodian by his pre-existing relation as
agent for one or the other of the parties, has been discussed pre-
viously.92 No doubt practically he often is such depositary. The
easiest way for the broker to close his deal and get his commis-
sion is to use the method most familiar in the locality. An attempt
to lead the parties into a new scheme, such as the conveyancing
trust, causes hesitation and may give the parties time to change
their minds.
90. U. S. Code of Laws (1925) Bks. and Bking. sec. 248(k).
91. That farsightedly it is to the best interest of realtors to keep free
from the entanglements of the escrow depositary, see Lawy. and Bkr. 17:371.
92. Supra, p. 676.
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In some states the purposes for which real property trusts can
be created are limited by statute.93 Are conveyancing trusts within
these statutory purposes? They are possibly trusts to "sell" real
property, if the grantee from the trustee is to be a third person, not
a party to the trust instrument. But this is doubtful. The trustee
does not solicit buyers or negotiate sales. If title is to go from the
trustee to a party, to the trust instrument, the function of the
trustee would seem surely to be described by the words "to con-
vey," but the conveyance is not to be "for the benefit of creditors," or
"for the benefit of legatees," or "to satisfy any charge thereon." The
trust is surely not to accumulate or receive and pay over income.
At least in New York,94 the statutory restrictions seem to be ill-
adapted to the trust for conveyancing purposes.
93. Bogert on "Trusts" p. 160.
94. N. Y. Real Prop. Law sec. 96; Stanley v. Payne 65 Misc. 77; Bryant
v. Shaw 190 N. Y. App. Div. 578.
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